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ABSTRACT
We present a model of flight to quality episodes that emphasizes financial system risk and the
Knightian uncertainty surrounding these episodes. In the model, agents are uncertain about the
probability distribution of shocks in markets different from theirs, treating such uncertainty as
Knightian. Aversion to this uncertainty generates demand for safe financial claims. It also leads
agents to require financial intermediaries to lock-up capital to cover their own markets' shocks in
a manner that is robust to uncertainty over other markets. These actions are wasteful in the
aggregate and can trigger a financial accelerator. A lender of last resort can unlock private capital











a-krishnamurthy@northwestern.edu“... Policy practitioners operating under a risk-management paradigm may, at times, be led to
undertake actions intended to provide insurance against especially adverse outcomes...... When
confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty, human beings invariably attempt
to disengage from medium to long-term commitments in favor of safety and liquidity.... The
immediate response on the part of the central bank to such ﬁnancial implosions must be to inject
large quantities of liquidity...” Alan Greenspan (2004).
Flight-to-quality episodes are an important source of ﬁnancial instability. Modern examples of these
episodes in the US include the Penn Central default of 1970; the stock market crash of 1987; the events
of the Fall of 1998 beginning with the Russian default and ending with the bailout of LTCM; as well as
the events that followed the attacks of 9/11. Behind each of these episodes lies the specter of a meltdown
that may lead to a prolonged slowdown as in Japan during the 1990s, or even a catastrophe like the Great
Depression.1
From a broad-brush standpoint, ﬂight-to-quality episodes involve an increase in perceived risk. However,
the risk does not circumscribe a purely fundamental shock, and instead centers around the ﬁnancial system.
For example, the Russian default in the summer of 1998 eliminated a small fraction of the trillions of dollars
of US wealth. Although small, the default created circumstances that severely strained the ﬁnancial sector.
As prices of illiquid assets fell, losses grew in commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge funds, leading
investors to question the safety of the ﬁnancial sector. Investors withdrew risk-capital from the aﬀected
markets and institutions and moved into short-term and liquid assets. Bottlenecks in the movement of
capital emerged as sophisticated parts of the ﬁnancial system were compromised while other sectors of the
economy were relatively unaﬀected. The primary risk during this episode was ﬁnancial system risk.
In this paper we develop a model of a ﬂight-to-quality episode. In practice, the occurrence of an unex-
pected event triggers an increase in agents’ perception of risk. We take this shock as exogenous, and focus on
two important eﬀects that arise during ﬂight-to-quality episodes: agents demand safe and certain ﬁnancial
claims; and ﬁnancial bottlenecks develop that hinder capital movement and segment ﬁnancial markets. The
increase in risk and demand for safety are a hallmark of ﬂight-to-quality episodes. Bottlenecks transform
ﬂight to quality into a macroeconomic problem by triggering and amplifying collateral shortages and ﬁnancial
multipliers. It is this systemic dimension that motivates the Fed’s reactions, as indicated by Greenspan’s
comments.
Our model focuses on agent’s perceptions regarding the ability of ﬁnancial intermediaries to deliver
on promises of credit. Agents contract with ﬁnancial intermediaries to cover liquidity shocks that may
arise in their markets. However, agents are uncertain about the probability model describing shocks in
1See Table 1 (part A) in Barro (2005) for a comprehensive list of extreme events in developed economies during the 20th
century.
2markets diﬀerent from theirs, treating such uncertainty as Knightian. If ﬁnancial intermediaries have limited
collateral, agents grow concerned that shocks may arise in other markets that will deplete the resources of
intermediaries and compromise their promises of credit. Such riskiness rises either through an increase in
Knightian uncertainty or a fall in intermediation collateral. The increase in perceived riskiness generates
conservatism and a demand for safety. We study the case in which agents shield themselves from the increased
risk by formulating plans that are robust to their uncertainty regarding other markets. We show that agents
require ﬁnancial intermediaries to lock-up some capital to devote to their own markets’ shocks, regardless of
what happens in other markets. Once locked-up, intermediaries’ capital is not free to move across markets
in response to shocks, resulting in bottlenecks and market segmentation.
The interaction between Knightian uncertainty and limited intermediation collateral is at the heart of
our analysis. The following example illustrates our main ideas. Suppose that two agents, A and B,h a v e
some liquidity needs, which are provided for by contracting with an intermediary. However, the intermediary
has a limited supply of liquidity (one unit for our example), that it must allocate between these two agents.
There are two states that can occur, s1 and s2 with probabilities π(s1)a n dπ(s2). While both A and B
value liquidity in each state, A has a higher marginal valuation of liquidity in s1 than B, with the situation
reversed in s2. Thus it is “eﬃcient” to provide more liquidity to A in s1 and more to B in s2:
B
A
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Now suppose that A and B view the uncertainty over the realization of states s1 or s2 in a Knightian
fashion. In particular, suppose that A and B are unsure over the probabilities π(s1)a n dπ(s2). Then a
potential problem with achieving this eﬃcient solution is that since A is receiving a lower liquidity allocation
in s2, he may overweight the chances that s2 will occur when making decisions. B may overweight s1.
Consider an alternative “non-contingent” hoarding solution, where each agent hoards 1
2 unit of liquidity












3A and B may reject the eﬃcient solution in favor of the non-contingent hoarding solution because it is
robust to the unknown probabilities. In equilibrium, the desire for robustness may lead to a non-contingent
allocation of liquidity.
In our model, we develop this example in a competitive, general equilibrium setting. We explain what
we mean by “eﬃcient” and “non-contingent.” We show that if intermediaries have suﬃcient collateral, the
robustness concern vanishes. In terms of our example above, if the intermediary has suﬃcient liquidity, it
does not need to ration the liquidity between A and B. Then A’s allocation depends less on the realization
of s1 or s2, and the robustness concern is reduced.
We present examples to connect our model to the behavior of agents during ﬂight to quality episodes.
One of our examples, as alluded to earlier, is the allocation of risk capital by a ﬁnancial intermediary. In a
ﬂight to quality, the intermediary locks-up risk capital to devote to individual markets, instead of allocating
risk capital in an eﬃcient shock-contingent fashion across markets.
In equilibrium, robustness concerns magnify an aggregate liquidity shortage and have macroeconomic
consequences. We show how a central bank’s commitment as a lender of last resort can aﬀect equilibrium
and potentially improve outcomes. In our model, the central bank can shift the private sector’s allocation
away from the hoarding solution and toward the eﬃcient solution.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. It helps to ﬁll a gap in the literature on ﬁnancial
frictions in business cycle models. Papers such as Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) highlight how ﬁnancial frictions in ﬁrms amplify aggregate shocks. Instead, we emphasize
how ﬁnancial frictions lead to greater (Knightian) uncertainty in response to shocks, and how this rise in
uncertainty feeds back into the ﬁnancial accelerator.
Our paper also studies the macroeconomic consequences of frictions in ﬁnancial intermediaries. In this
sense, our paper is closer to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Krishnamurthy (2003) that emphasize that
with complete ﬁnancial contracts, the aggregate collateral of intermediaries is ultimately behind ﬁnancial
ampliﬁcation mechanisms.
In terms of the policy implications, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) study how a shortage of aggregate
collateral limits private liquidity provision (see also Woodford, 1990). Their analysis suggests that a credible
government can issue government bonds which can then be used by the private sector for liquidity provision.
The key diﬀerence between our paper and those of Holmstrom and Tirole, and Woodford, is that we show how
even a large amount of collateral in the aggregate may be ineﬃciently used, so that private sector liquidity
provision is limited. In our model, the government intervention not only adds to the private sector’s collateral
but also, and more centrally, it improves the use of private collateral.
The model we develop illustrates how a lender of last resort commitment to insure a low probability
4extreme event stabilizes the economy.2 This result resembles Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where the beneﬁt
of a lender of last resort in bank runs is to rule out a “bad” equilibrium. However, our model has a unique
equilibrium; the bad event is just a low probability extreme event. In Diamond and Dybvig, a run is triggered
by depositors’ concern that they will be last in line to withdraw deposits. In our model, agents exaggerate
the odds that intermediaries will have exhausted their capital, and fail to deliver on promises of credit. In
Diamond and Dybvig, the bank run is a coordination failure. In our model, on the other hand, ﬂight to
quality results from agents overweighting the chance of an extreme event.
Flight-to-quality episodes have ﬁnancial and real eﬀects. On the ﬁnancial side, papers such as Krish-
namurthy (2002) and Longstaﬀ (2004) document that spreads between illiquid/risky assets and liquid/safe
assets widen during ﬂight to quality. Gatev and Strahan (2005) document that investors shift their portfolios
away from risky assets such as Commercial Paper and toward safe bank deposits during these episodes, while
ﬁrms draw down credit lines from these banks. These actions are consistent with our model, as we predict
that agents shift toward well capitalized ﬁnancial intermediaries that are less sensitive to the robustness
concerns of agents. A number of papers have also documented that the widening of the spread between
Commercial Paper and Treasury Bills is a powerful leading indicator for cyclical downturns (see, e.g., Stock
and Watson, 1989, Friedman and Kuttner, 1993, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993).
There is a growing economics literature that aims to formalize Knightian uncertainty (a partial list of
contributions includes, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994),
Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2003), Skiadas (2003), Epstein and Schneider (2004), and Hansen, et al. (2004)).
As in much of this literature, we use a max-min device to describe agents expected utility. Our treatment of
Knightian uncertainty is most similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler, in that agents choose a worst case among
a class of priors.
Our paper applies max-min expected utility theory to agents who we interpret as running ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
These ﬁrms typically stress-test their models to various extreme scenarios before formulating investment
policies. The widespread use of Value-at-Risk as a decision making criterion is an example of robust decision
making in practice. Corporate liquidity management is also done with a worst case scenario for cash-ﬂows
in mind. We view the max-min preferences of the agents we study as descriptive of decision rules that
overweight a worst-case rather than as stemming from a deeper psychological foundation. In much of the
paper we refer to agents as robust decision makers. This terminology most closely corresponds to the decision
making process of the ﬁnancial institutions that concern us in this paper.
Routledge and Zin (2004) also begin from the observation that ﬁnancial institutions follow decision rules
2Easley and O’Hara (2005) study a model where ambiguity averse traders focus on a worst case scenario when making an
investment decision. Like us, Easley and O’Hara point out that government intervention in a worst-case scenario can have large
eﬀects.
5to protect against a worst case scenario. They develop a model of market liquidity in which an uncertainty
averse market maker sets bids and asks to facilitate trade of an asset. Their model captures an important
aspect of ﬂight to quality: uncertainty aversion can lead to a sudden widening of the bid-ask spread, causing
agents to halt trading and reducing market liquidity. Both our paper and Routledge and Zin share the
emphasis on ﬁnancial intermediation and uncertainty aversion as central ingredients in ﬂight to quality
episodes. But each paper captures diﬀerent aspects of ﬂight to quality.
In our model, agents are only Knightian with respect to other markets and not their own market. Ep-
stein (2001) explores the home bias in international portfolios in a similar setup. As Epstein points out, this
modeling also highlights the diﬀerence between high risk aversion and aversion to Knightian uncertainty.
Moreover, our modeling shows that max-min preferences interact with macroeconomic conditions in ways
that are not present in models with an invariant amount of risk aversion. We show that when aggregate inter-
mediary collateral is plentiful, Knightian and standard agents behave identically. However when aggregate
collateral falls, the actions of these agents diﬀer, leading to ﬂight to quality in the Knightian model.
In Section 1 we describe the environment and characterizes decisions and equilibrium. Section 2 explains
the implications of our model for ﬂight-to-quality episodes. Section 3 derives the value of a lender of last
resort in our economy. Sections 4 and 5 illustrate the interaction between aggregate collateral and robustness.
Section 6 concludes.
1 The Environment
We consider a continuous time economy with a single consumption good. At date 0, the economy enters
a phase where liquidity shocks may take place, and it exits this phase at some random date τ, distributed
exponentially with hazard rate δ. We study the economy conditional on entering this liquidity phase.
Liquidity demand
There are two groups of agents, each with unit measure, whose members we label as agent-type A and
B. Each individual derives utility from consumption at date τ:
Ui = u(ci
τ)=l nci
τ i ∈{ A,B}. (1)
where the log-utility assumption is primarily made for expositional reasons (we retain the more general
notation u(.) where convenient). There is no discounting.
Each agent is endowed at date 0 with w0 in consumption goods. These goods are perishable, and are
used to purchase ﬁnancial claims – see below.
In the normal course of business, the agents can expect to earn a proﬁt of Π when exiting the liquidity
phase, so that cτ = Π. However, the agents may receive a “liquidity shock” that reduces proﬁts to 0 unless
6they have some liquidity available to them immediately. With such liquid funds, agents can insure against
the fall in proﬁts. We normalize the return on the liquidity investment to one, so that investing l of liquid
funds results in a consumption level of cτ(l)=l.
The liquidity shock is common to all agents of a given type. We will think of all agents of a type as
belonging to a particular market, so that the shock has the interpretation of a market-speciﬁc shock. The
shock occurs to each market at most once between 0 and τ. The arrival of the shock is Poisson, with intensity
λ. The shocks are uncorrelated across markets.
Agents purchase ﬁnancial claims that deliver some liquidity to them in the event of the liquidity shock
and thereby insure against the fall in proﬁts.
Liquidity supply and aggregate collateral constraint
The ﬁnancial sector consists of intermediaries who sell liquidity insurance to A and B at date 0. We
think of these intermediaries as having some capital available to allocate across A and B’s markets in the
event of shocks.
Financial intermediaries are required to collateralize all sales of liquidity insurance. We assume that
insurers have ready access to consumption goods at all dates, and are only restricted in their supply of
liquidity insurance by their collateral. For now, we assume that collateral is riskless and worth Z, but later
in the paper we relax this assumption and study situations where the collateral value varies over time and
across states (see Sections 5 and 6).
The intermediaries’ objective is to maximize the date 0 revenue from the sale of the insurance less a cost
of the insurance resources disbursed at time s of β per unit:
UI = cI
0 + βcI
s,β ≥ 0( 2 )
and subject to the collateral constraint that, in any state, the insurer does not write insurance exceeding Z.
Financial claims
Each agent is uncertain about whether he will be hit by a shock or not and about the order in which
shocks will take place. There is a complete set of Arrow-Debreu claims contingent on the shock realizations
of both types of agents. We deﬁne x(s) as a claim that pays one at date s, conditional on the shock at date
s being the ﬁrst one. ys(t) is a claim paying one at date t, conditional on the ﬁrst shock having occurred at
date s<t .
Robustness
Agents purchase ﬁnancial claims from the intermediaries to insure against their liquidity shocks. In
making the insurance decisions, agents have a probability model of the liquidity shocks in mind. But, while
7each agent knows the intensity of the shock in his own market, he is unsure of the intensity of the shock in
the other agent-types’ market. We explore the case in which agents formulate decisions that are robust to
the intensity of the other agents’ shock.
We write all of our problems from the standpoint of agent(s) A, referring to the other agent-type as B,
and denoting A’s assessment of B’s intensity as λB.






τ ) | λB,λ A]
where Λ is a class of alternative probability models that agent A deems as possible.3
Discussion of setup
Our model studies an economy conditional on entering a liquidity episode. It is silent on what triggers the
episode. In practice, we think that the occurrence of an unexpected event, such as the LTCM or Enron crises,
causes agents to re-evaluate their models and triggers robustness concerns. We focus on the mechanisms that
play out during the liquidity episode: How do agents’ robustness concerns aﬀect prices and quantities? How
do these robustness concerns interact with aggregate constraints? What is the role of an outside liquidity
provider such as the central bank?
We think of the agents in our model as ﬁnancial specialists who actively participate in a single market.
For example, the agents may be ﬁrms in a single industry that is susceptible to a temporary drop in cash-ﬂow.
Alternatively, the agents may be banks that are susceptible to an outﬂow of deposits. Finally, the agents
may be hedge-funds/market-makers who are susceptible to a shock to their trading capital. In all of these
cases, we model the agents who are responsible for insuring against a temporary liquidity shortfall.
We view agents’ max-min preferences as descriptive of their decision rules. The widespread use of worst-
case scenario analysis in decision making example of the robustness preferences of such agents.4
Our main goal is to investigate why these robustness concerns are important in the aggregate and are
aﬀected by aggregate conditions. In principle, the demand for safety by a sector of hedge funds, say during
the Russian default, can be easily accommodated by the rest of the capital market, with negligible eﬀects
on asset prices or quantities. Yet, in practice, capital does not move freely across markets to provide the
necessary liquidity. There are bottlenecks, suggesting that there are constraints on the supply of capital.
We model these constraints by assuming that ﬁnancial intermediaries, who specialize in capital reallocation,
3We study arrangements where the ﬁnancial intermediary provides insurance, ruling out direct consumption insurance
arrangements between A and B. In keeping with our collateral restrictions on the intermediary, we may think of A and B as
having no collateral and therefore being unable to support such insurance arrangements. If we assigned Z/2 collateral to each
of the agents to support mutual insurance, agents’ robustness concerns would reduce such insurance. Intermediaries maximize
the use of collateral.
4See Routledge and Zin (2004) for a more extensive discussion of examples of max-min behavior among ﬁnancial specialists.
8are limited by a collateral constraint. The collateral of the intermediary measures the maximum amount of
capital they can supply to a particular market. Since the intermediaries are risk-neutral, they will supply
insurance to our agents. But, in aggregate, the collateral constraints place a limit on how much the supply-
side can respond to the robustness-concerns triggered during a liquidity episode.
Our model assumes that there are complete liquidity-shock-contingent ﬁnancial claims. Moreover, agents
prearrange insurance against liquidity shocks at date 0. In practice, liquidity shocks trigger dynamic trading
in asset markets – for example, by shedding risky assets and moving to Treasury Bills – so that agents’
responses are ex-post and not all ex-ante. We have chosen our strategy despite its interpretability costs
because, as usual, with complete Arrow-Debreu markets a dynamic problem can be more easily stated as a
static one. More substantively, our objective is to provide an endogenous explanation for why capital does
not move across markets, as opposed to making an exogenous segmentation/incomplete markets assumption.
The assumption of complete liquidity-shock-contingent claims isolates the mechanism we highlight.
As a matter of interpretation, the ex-ante insurance contracts can be thought of as collateralized contin-
gent credit-lines.
2 Decisions and Equilibrium
In this section we describe agents’ decisions and equilibrium, and contrast them with a benchmark case
where robustness is not a concern. Flight-to-quality, which we discuss more fully in the next section, is
described in terms of the diﬀerence in agents’ equilibrium decisions across these two cases.
2.1 The cost of locking collateral
The problem of a ﬁnancial intermediary is to sell ˆ x(s) ﬁrst-shock claims and ˆ ys(t) second-shock claims in
order to maximize revenue less the cost of providing liquidity insurance, subject to the collateral constraint.
Denote the price of the ﬁrst-shock claim p(s) and the price of the second-shock claim qs(t). Also, denote
φ1(s) as the (true) probability of the ﬁrst event, and φs(t) as the (true) probability of the second event.5
We assume that the insurer has no robustness concerns and knows these true probabilities, but it turns







(p(s) − βφ1(s))ˆ x(s)+
 ∞
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ˆ x(s) ≤ Z (4)
5With φ1(s)=λe−(δ+2λ)s and φs(t)=λ2e−λse−(δ+λ)t.
9and
ˆ x(s)+ˆ ys(t) ≤ Z. (5)
Constraints (4) and (5) are standard collateral constraints that agents impose on the intermediary.
Consider an agent looking to purchase ﬁrst-shock insurance. We assume that this agent can observe the
balance sheet of the intermediary, i.e., the collateral levels of the intermediary and the claims the intermediary
has sold to other agents. The agent only purchases ﬁrst-shock insurance if the intermediary has suﬃcient
collateral, Z, to cover all of his liabilities, ˆ x(s). This gives the constraint (4).
On the other hand, an agent looking to purchase second-shock insurance is concerned about both the
ﬁrst- and second-shock insurance that the insurer has sold. Since second-shock insurance is paid only after
ﬁrst-shock claims have been settled, the eﬀective collateral that backs up second-shock insurance is Z− ˆ x(s).
The second-shock claim buyers require that the eﬀective collateral of the insurer covers all second-shock
insurance sold. Thus, we arrive at (5).
Because of the linearity of the objective function, if the collateral constraints do not bind the solution to
problem (3) yields that ˆ x(s)a n dˆ ys(t) are at an interior only if,
p(s)=βφ1(s)
qs(t)=βφs(t).
For example, when β = 1, prices are actuarially fair at an interior solution.
We are interested in the case when insurance is limited by the insurer’s collateral. In this case, assuming
the second constraint binds in equilibrium for all (s,t) pairs, and denoting by µs(t) > 0 the corresponding






Prices now rise to reﬂect the scarcity of collateral (µ>0). Integrating the expression for qs(t) to obtain the













The term φ2(s) is the probability of the economy receiving two shocks before the liquidity event is over. It
is equal to the probability of receiving a single shock, φ1(s), multiplied by the conditional probability of
10receving one more shock prior to the end of the liquidity episode, λ
λ+δ.T h u sq(s)i sm a d eo ft h es u mo ft h e
expected cost of a two-shocks policy for the insurer, and the multiplier on the collateral constraint, µ(s).
An important point to note about the expressions for q(s)a n dp(s) is that the multiplier is common to
both and does not depend on the probability of each of these events. That is, a tight collateral constraint
pushes up the price of contingent claims regardless of the probability of the insurance-event. Intuitively,
this is because the collateral constraint requires that if ˆ x(s) is high, then insurance on the second shock is
curtailed for all t>s . Thus the opportunity cost of writing more ﬁrst-shock claims is that less second-shock
claims can be oﬀered. Both claim prices have to be in line because they both reﬂect a common cost of locking
collateral. We can make this point more precise by solving out µ(s) and writing p(s)i nt e r m so fq(s):
p(s)=q(s)+β(φ1(s) − φ2(s)). (8)
The common cost of locking collateral arises because of the sequential shock structure of the economy.
The second shock only occurs after the ﬁrst shock has occurred. If the ˆ x(s)a n dˆ y(s) claims corresponded to
two mutually exclusive events, then the intermediary could use the same collateral to back liquidity insurance
in each event. In such case, selling more ˆ y(s) claims does not impinge on the intermediary’s ability to sell
ˆ x(s) claims, so that the prices of claims need not be aligned.
We are most interested in the opportunity cost of using collateral, as opposed to the actuarial cost of
writing liquidity insurance. To simplify some of our expressions, we assume for now that β =0a n dt h e r e b y
drop the second term on the right-hand-side of (8) to yield:
p(s)=q(s). (9)
This pricing expression is the main result from modelling the supply side of the economy. It captures the
equilibrium cost of “locking” collateral.
2.2 A benchmark
Before turning to the agent’s decision problem, we pause to establish a “benchmark” for the model when















where η(t − s)=( λ + δ)e−(λ+δ)(t−s) represents the probability that a second shock takes place at time t,
conditional on a second shock taking place at some date greater than s.
In this objective, x(s) is the amount of liquidity insurance delivered to the ﬁrst agent who receives a
shock, while ys(t) is the amount of insurance delivered to the second agent who receives a shock. The ﬁrst
term in the objective is the expected utility in the event that no shocks arrive and agents consume Π. This
11term is invariant to the x(s)a n dys(t) decisions, and where convenient we omit it.6 The second term is the
expected utility from the ﬁrst shock arriving at date s, and the second shock occurring at a date t prior to
(exit) date τ.
The constraints in the optimization are:
0 ≤ x(s) ≤ Z
and
0 ≤ x(s)+ys(t) ≤ Z.
Since β = 0, the only limitation on liquidity insurance delivered to the agents is the supply of collateral of
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Thus the planner simply allocates the limited collateral across time and agents.
The second collateral constraint has to bind since it subsumes the ﬁrst constraint, and there is no other
cost of providing insurance than the collateral limitation.
ys(t) ≡ y(s)=Z − x(s).
Thus we ﬁnd that ys(t) allocations are not a function of the time interval between the ﬁrst and second shock,
t. The expression also reﬂects the cost of locking collateral that we referred to earlier. Z can either be used
to back x(s) insurance, or to back ys(t) insurance, but not both. In this sense, oﬀering more of one kind of
insurance restricts the amount of the other kind.








[φ1(s)u(x(s)) + φ2(s)u(y(s))] ds,
which can be solved by maximizing pointwise for each s.
Proposition 1 In the benchmark economy, the ﬁrst order conditions characterizing insurance decisions






























6We also omit a 2 that should multiply the objective function throughout to weight the two groups.
12In words, once an agent is hit by a liquidity shock, the planner has an incentive to allocate more than
half of the resources to the agent in distress. This is because as long as δ>0 there is a chance that the
second agent never gets hit and scarce liquidity goes wasted.
We note that x(s) is constant and increasing with respect to δ. We are interested in liquidity crisis
episodes where δ is large (temporary phenomena). In these cases, the benchmark reveals a strong incentive
to inject funds aggressively to the ﬁrst group of agents hit by a shock.
In the benchmark competitive equilibrium without robustness considerations, the incentive for agents
to purchase more x than y claims follows directly from the pricing schedule of a collateral constrained
intermediary that we derived in the ﬁrst part of this section. As δ rises, the single-shock event becomes more
probable than the two-shock event. However, because the prices of both ﬁrst and second shock ﬁnancial
claims reﬂect a common cost of locking collateral, the prices of both claims remain equal, favoring the
purchase of the ﬁrst-shock claim over the second-shock claim.
2.3 The agents’ decision problem
An agent type A (henceforth agent A, for short) solves a decision problem where he chooses the paths of
x(s)a n dys(t), attempting to be robust to values of λB. In this subsection, we characterize the optimal
choice of x(s)a n dys(t) given a particular value of λB.













where, from the exponential distribution function, the probabilities (as perceived by A)a r e :
φA
1 (s) ≡ P(First shock is A’s, at s) = λe−(δ+λ+λB)s,
φA





The agent maximizes V (·) subject to his budget constraint:
max
{x(s)≥0},{ys(t)≥0}









ds ≤ w0 (11)
The budget constraint reﬂects purchase of x(s)a n dys(t), given prices of p(s)a n dqs(t) and the initial
endowment of w0. The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimization are:
φA
1 (s)u (x(s)) = ψp(s) (12)
and
φA
2 (s)η(t − s)u (ys(t)) = ψqs(t), (13)
where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
13We can simplify the characterization of the agent’s decision using the result from our earlier analysis of
the intermediary’s problem. There we found that p(s)a n dqs(t) are related to each other by a common cost







 (ys(t))dt = ψp(s)








η(t − s)u (ys(t))dt (14)
We can simplify this relation considerably by using the knowledge that in all equilibria, ys(t)=Z −x(s),
so that ys(t) is only a function of s and not of t. Since all insurance has to be backed by the collateral of Z,
for each s, the agent’s insurance decisions sum to Z in equilibrium.7
Since the probability of receiving a second shock prior to the end of the liquidity episode conditional on
having received a ﬁrst shock at date s is equal to λB
δ+λ, we can simplify the right-hand side of (14), to ﬁnd:




















As one would expect, the solution to the agent’s decision problem coincides with the solution in the
benchmark, (10), when λB = λ.8 More generally, for λB <λ+ δ agents insure more against the ﬁrst-shock
than the second-shock. Note, however, that the ratio of x to y claims is decreasing with respect to λB:
The more likely the other agent is expected to be hit by a shock, the more agent A reallocates demand to
7Note that we are not imposing the requirement that ys(t)=Z − x(s) in agents’ decisions. Instead, we are using the
knowledge that since in equilibrium, ys(t)=Z − x(s), only certain price functionals are possible. For a given λB, all feasible
equilibrium price functionals, qs(t), must take the form (with respect to t),
qs(t)=c(s)e−(λ+δ)(t−s),









η(t − s)dt =1 ,
we conclude that, ys(t)=y(s), regardless of λB.









(Note that the multiplier on the budget constraint is ψ = 1
w0
λ
δ+λ for the case of log utility.)
14second-shock claims. A thereby ensures that he still receives payments if he is hit by a liquidity shock as
well.
2.4 Robustness and equilibrium
We now turn to the robustness step. In equation (15) we characterized the decision problem for agent A
in choosing x(s)r e l a t i v et oys(t), given a particular value of λB. These choices deﬁned an expected utility
function V ({x(s)},{ys(t)},λ B). The robustness step for agent A is to make these choices while being robust
to alternative values of λB.
In the game-theoretic language often used to describe max-min expected utility theory, agent A ﬁrst
chooses x(s)a n dys(t), then “nature” chooses λB ∈ Λ to minimize the utility of agent A, given his choices.





V ({x(s)},{ys(t)},λ B) (18)
given equilibrium prices p(s)a n dqs(t) and the budget constraint. We assume the set of alternative models
over which agents would like to be robust is an interval deﬁned by:
max{0,λ− K}≤λB ≤ λ + K.
K indexes the robustness preferences of agents, with a larger K corresponding to a more extreme worst-case
scenario.
The following proposition presents the main result of this section:
Proposition 3 The following insurance decisions constitute an equilibrium in the robust economy:






We refer to this case as the “partially robust” case.
• For K ≥ δ, agents’ decisions are as if λB = λ + δ:
xfr
yfr =1 .
We refer to this equal claims case as the “fully robust” case.
• In both cases, agents’ decisions are time invariant.
15When K = 0, the model collapses to the benchmark model without the robustness concern, and decisions
are as if λB = λ.A sK rises, agents become concerned that they will receive a shock second, in which case
their larger purchases of ﬁrst-shock insurance will be wasted. As a result, they reduce their purchases of
ﬁrst-shock insurance and increase their purchases of second-shock insurance. At the extreme, when K is
large enough, they equate their purchases of ﬁrst and second-shock claims, and thereby insulate themselves
against their uncertainty over the likelihood of market B receiving a shock.
The formal proof reﬂects the intuition we have provided, but is complicated by two issues. First, agents
make their insurance decisions anticipating that the worst case λB will depend on those decisions; and,
second, equilibrium prices are a function of the anticipated worst case of agents (but in an individual agent’s
decision problem, prices are taken as given).
Proof. First, we derive the prices in the proposed equilibrium. Denote the λB on which agents base
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we can substitute to solve out for x(s)a n dy(s). To ﬁnd prices, we substitute the derived quantities into the









(λ + δ + ˜ λ)(λ + δ)e−(λ+δ+˜ λ)s−(λ+δ)(t−s) (20)
Small K: Consider the robustness step next. For small K, we wish to show that, at equilibrium prices, the
highest utility attainable when solving,




V ({x(s)},{ys(t)},λ B) (21)
occurs at xpr and ypr, and given these choices by the agent, “nature” always chooses λB = λ+K.M o r e o v e r ,
no other choice of {x(s)} and {ys(t)} can induce nature to choose a λB that results in a higher utility for
the agent.
9If agent A receives a shock ﬁrst, then his second-shockinsurance claim disappears. The same applies to B. Thus, the insurer
economizes his limited collateral by only backing the two possible shock sequences of A then B,a n dB then A.
16Given an assumed worst case of λ+K, and equilibrium prices (19) and (20), the unique optimum to the
agents max problem, (11), is:
x(s)=
λ + δ
λ + δ + ˜ λ
e−(λB−˜ λ)sZ and, y(s) ≡ ys(t)=
λB
λ + δ + ˜ λ
e−(λB−˜ λ)sZ
At ˜ λ = λB, x(s)a n dy(s) are constant functions of time. Using this knowledge, we can derive the
expected utility function for the agent as,

























Using the envelope theorem, we ﬁnd that,
VλB =
λ
(δ + λ + λB)2 [u(ypr) − u(xpr)]
which is strictly negative around the benchmark (λB = λ) and as long as xpr >y pr. Thus, since for small
values of K, xpr >y pr, it is apparent that the agent is particularly unprotected if nature chooses to increase
λB, since such a choice makes ﬁrst-shock claims less valuable to the agent, and the agent is over-weight in
holding these claims. Moreover, since the constraint set in choosing λ ∈ Λ is linear, for small enough K
(i.e. the agent considers only small deviations in the model), the utility of the agent at choices (xpr,y pr)i s
minimized when λB = λ + K (i.e. highest value possible).
Next, deﬁne V pr ≡ V (xpr,y pr,λ B = λ + K). We now argue, by contradiction, that V pr is the highest
utility attainable in (21). Suppose there exist choices of {x(s)} and {ys(t)} which result in V> V pr.I t
should be clear that such choices can only increase utility if they induce nature to choose λB <λ+K.N o t e
that since the optimization problem in (11) is strictly concave, the ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne a unique
optimum. If the agent makes any choice other than xpr and ypr and nature continues to choose a worst
case of λB = λ + K, then the induced utility is strictly lower than V pr. Moreover, since nature can always
choose λB = λ + K given the agent’s deviation, nature’s optimal choice of λB further lowers the utility of
the agent. Thus, the agent can do no better than to choose xpr and ypr.
Large K: For large values of K, the gap between ﬁrst-shock and second-shock claims narrows until it
disappears once K = δ. At this point, the agent becomes fully robust with respect to any λB, since when
x = y,
VλB =0
for any λB.A tK = δ, the agent attains utility of V fr ≡ V (Z
2 , Z
2 ,λ B = λ+δ). Further increases in K expand
the constraint set for nature, and thereby weakly decrease the highest utility attainable in (21). However,
17the agent can guarantee himself V fr by choosing x = y = Z
2 . Thus, the fully robust choices continue to
attain the highest possible utility in (21) for all K ≥ δ.
3 Flight-to-Quality Episodes
We now discuss the connection between our model and ﬂight-to-quality episodes. At a broad level our model
shows how, given a limited capacity of the economy for liquidity provision (Z), the actions of robust agents
may further reduce the liquidity available to the economy. We begin this section with examples of these
robust actions and how they reduce aggregate liquidity. We then discuss the macroeconomic consequences
of ﬂight to quality episodes.
We generate a ﬂight to quality in the model as a comparitive static in which λB rises. In practice, many
accounts of ﬂight to quality episodes begin with an unexpected event that leads agents to reassess their
models. In 1970, the unexpected event was the Penn Central default on Commercial Paper. In 1987, it was
the sharp drop in the stock market. In terms of our model, a reassessment of models can be thought of as a
rise in K (for K<δ ), which then leads to a rise in λB.
For a ﬁxed K, an alternative way to generate ﬂight to quality in our model is to reduce Z. We explain this
case in more detail in Section 5, but the intuition is clear enough. A fall in Z increases ﬁnancial intermediary
risk as agents grow concerned that intermediaries may not have enough collateral to cover their shocks.
Agents worry about being second and raise λB. Some episodes, such as the Fall of 1998, can be thought of
in terms of ﬁnancial intermediary risk.
3.1 Example: Intermediary capital allocation
In equilibrium, markets A and B are guaranteed liquidity of
y =m i n {x,y}.
In addition to the minimum level of insurance, x − y ≥ 0 of liquidity is delivered to the ﬁrst market that
receives a shock.
We can intepret this behavior in terms of intermediaries’ capital allocation decision. y of the capital of an
intermediary is locked-up to service each market (“committed capital”), and x − y capital is free (“trading
capital”) to move to the ﬁrst market with the shock. As λB rises, x−y falls and there is less trading capital
to allocate ﬂexibly across markets. In the fully robust case, x − y = 0, and markets are segmented.
In many ﬂight to quality episodes, bottlenecks arise in the movement of capital and markets appear seg-
mented. For example, in the Fall of 1998 episode the markets where hedge funds specialized were particularly
aﬀected by the crisis, as capital did not ﬂow into these markets.
18Notice that segmentation is the market’s response to agents’ robustness concerns. Since agents require
ﬁnancial claims that are uncontingent on shocks outside their own markets, the market provides such claims
by committing intermediaries to segment their capital.
3.2 Example: Run on banks’ credit facility/deposits
We can interpret the ﬁnancial claims of A and B as credit lines from intermediaries. The agents recognize
that intermediaries have a limited amount of capital to back up these credit lines. The robustness concern
is that A agents are worried that B’s shocks will deplete the bank’s limited credit facility ﬁrst. By setting
x = y, they insulate themselves from this concern. In practice, the robustness action may be reﬂected by A
preemptively drawing down a credit line at a date when the fear of large B shocks arises. As markets are
complete in our model, the future action by A is prearranged at date 0, by choosing x = y.10
Although the actions of agents in our model are most naturally interpreted as a run on banks’ credit
facility, at a deeper level, agents’ actions are also related to the more commonly analyzed run on banks’
deposits. As Diamond and Dybvig (1983) emphasize, a deposit contract implements an optimal shock-
contingent allocation of liquidity. In the fully robust equilibrium of our model, agents choose an allocation
that is non-contingent on each other’s shocks instead of the contingent liquidity allocation of the benchmark
economy. Agents each hoard Z/2 units of liquidity to cover their own shocks, independent of other markets’
shocks. In this sense, robust agents’ preference for shock independent liquidity allocations is related the
behavior of panicked depositors in a bank run.
The essence of a ﬂight-to-quality episode is agents’ demand for certainty. The empirical counterpart of
the demand for uncontingent insurance as λB rises is that agents may shift their demands toward extremely
well collateralized ﬁnancial institutions. With a less well collateralized institution, an agent fears that his
ﬁnancial claim is contingent on the other markets’ shocks. Thus our model is consistent with the increased
demand for bank deposits and bank credit lines that accompanies ﬂight to quality (see Gatev and Strahan,
2005).
In Section 6 we show that these actions by the agents trigger a reaction by insurers to ensure the safety
of their own collateral. Insurers increase their valuation of riskless assets relative to risky assets, which is
consistent with the widening of the spread between Commercial Paper and Treasury bills that accompanies
ﬂight to quality.
10We can also interpret robustness in terms of the internal risk management of an investment bank: Desk A of an investment
bank lobbies for more risk capital, because of fear that desk B will suﬀer losses soon, reducing the bank’s total risk capital.
193.3 Example: Liquidity suppliers become demanders
In the crises of the Fall of 1998, hedge funds were retrenching from many markets and liquidating assets,
thereby reducing the overall supply of liquidity (see Kyle and Xiong, 2001). The natural liquidity providers
to markets became liquidity demanders.
We may think of the robustness concern in our model as corresponding in practice to hedge funds’ (or
their investors’) fears that market liquidity will fall, causing the hedge funds to overprotect against adverse
outcomes, further reducing market liquidity. For example, suppose a hedge fund in market A (or the fund’s
investors) requires enough other liquidity providers to participate in A to make the business proﬁtable. The
robust hedge fund grows concerned that shocks in market B could cause other liquidity providers to pull back
from market A. As a result, the hedge fund reduces the amount of capital (x) used currently for liquidity
provision in market A, and instead increases the buﬀer (y) against the possible B shock. The conservative
behavior reduces the liquidity of both market A and B.
In any ﬂight to quality episode, the capacity of ﬁnancial intermediaries – commercial and investment
banks, hedge funds, trading desks, market makers, etc. – to provide liquidity to markets is constrained.
At the abstract level of our model, Z reﬂects the capacity of liquidity providers, in aggregate, to provide
liquidity to markets. Our model does not distinguish among the various modes of liquidity provision we
observe in practice. Instead our model shows how the behavior of robust agents reduces the eﬀective Z of
the economy and compounds an aggregate liquidity shortage.
3.4 Price of liquidity provision
We can substitute the equilibrium values of x(s)a n dy(s) into the ﬁrst order conditions for agent A, (12)




(λ + δ + λB)e−(λ+δ+λB)s. (24)
As λB rises, equilibrium prices of insurance change as well. For small s, the exponential term in (24) is
dominated by the linear term so that the increase in K increases the prices of both ﬁrst and second-shock
claims:11
p(0) = q(0) =
w0
Z
(λ + δ + λB).
The increase in prices of the ﬁrst-shock insurance contract is indirect, driven by increased demand for
second-shock insurance. As we have shown earlier, when λB rises, robust agents decrease their demand
11Because the model has only two shocks, for s suﬃciently large, the increase in λB lessens the odds that the agent places
on surviving until date s without a shock. In these cases, the exponential term in (24) dominates and the prices of ﬁnancial
claims fall. The boundary between the small and large s occurs at s = 1
3λ+δ ;f o rδ large relative to λ, the boundary is at 1
δ
which is the half-life of the recessionary shock.
20for ﬁrst-shock insurance. They increase demand for second-shock insurance, causing insurers to lock-up
collateral for y and decrease the supply available to ﬁrst-shock insurance, thereby indirectly driving up the
price of ﬁrst-shock insurance.
The prices, p and q, represent the marginalcost of liquidityprovision in the economy. Since intermediaries
have a limited amount of collateral to back liquidity provision, at the aggregate level, Z parameterizes the
capacity of the economy to provide liquidity to markets. As robustness rises, the cost of liquidity provision
rises because the actions of robust agents reduce the eﬀective Z of the economy. With a richer asset structure,
the rise in the cost of liquidity provision will also be reﬂected as higher liquidity premia in the asset markets
where the intermediaries are active.
3.5 Macroeconomic cost
Suppose we introduce a small number of rational Savage agents into the economy. These agents, as in the
benchmark economy, will calculate that it is optimal to insure more against the ﬁrst-shock as opposed to the
second-shock. However, notice that these agents will have to trade at the same inﬂated liquidity insurance
prices that the robust agents face. At these high prices, the non-robust agents will also reduce the amount
of insurance they purchase, and leave themselves exposed to liquidity shocks (for low s).12 In this sense,
ﬂight to quality in our model is not just a problem aﬀecting the decision rules of robust agents. It has an
economy-wide cost.
When robust agents lock-up resources in their desire for certainty, the ﬁnancial system becomes inﬂexible
in its response to shocks. In the benchmark economy, xbe >y be,s ot h a txbe − ybe of collateral is left to
promise to the ﬁrst market that receives a shock. The freedom is valuable since as long as δ>0, there is a
good chance that the second shock never takes place.
An alternative way to see the collateral waste associated to a ﬂight-to-quality episode is to re-write the
constraint
x+ y ≤ Z
in terms of the risky and riskless claims Z can support:
(x − y)+2 y ≤ Z.
The riskless claim consumes twice as much collateral as a risky claim. Having all agents holding only riskless
claims, as in the fully robust equilibrium, locks up collateral that goes unused when δ>0.
12Recall that the change in prices depends on s.F o rl a r g es, prices fall since the rise in λB leads to a decline in the perceived
probability of shocks taking place. Hence rational Savage agents lower early insurance (both of x(s)a n dy(s)) as a result of the
presence of robust agents (the point we have highlighted) but increase late insurance.
21In practice, systemic risk is the important macroeconomic concern in ﬂight to quality episodes. When the
ﬁnancial system becomes inﬂexible, bottlenecks arise that can trigger accelerators and create system-wide
problems.
4 Locked Collateral and Extreme Event Intervention
In this section we study the impact of a lender of last resort on the economy. We consider a central bank
that obtains resources ex-post, at some cost, which it can credibly pledge to agents in the two-shock extreme
event. In practice, this pledge may be supported by costly ex-post inﬂation or taxation and carried out by
guaranteeing, against default, the liabilities of ﬁnancial intermediaries who have sold ﬁnancial claims to both
markets. We analyze the impact and marginal beneﬁt of such a guarantee.
Formally, we assume that the government credibly expands the collateral of the ﬁnancial sector in the
two-shock event by an amount G. Thus, the collateral constraints on intermediaries are altered to
x + y ≤ Z + G.
Since we are interested in computing the marginal beneﬁt of intervention, we study an inﬁnitesimal inter-
vention of G. The intervention has no eﬀect on the constraint for ﬁrst-shock insurance.
4.1 Welfare criterion
A delicate issue arises when agents have non-Savage preferences: In evaluating policy, should the central
bank also adopt the agents’ preferences? Or, should it take a more paternalistic approach in which it is
concerned with agents’ ex-post average utility from consumption?
As noted earlier in the paper, we think of the robustness preferences as a realistic depiction of the
decision rules of ﬁnancial specialists (e.g., value-at-risk constraints). From this perspective, it is not clear
why a central bank should build biases into its objective function that may lead to obvious average losses,
just because agents exhibit these biases. Sims (2001) has made this point in questioning the application
of robust control to central bank policymaking. He argues that max-min preferences are simpy shortcuts
to generate observed behavior of economic agents, but should not be seen as deeper preferences. In what
follows, we begin by analyzing a welfare function based on agents’ expected utility functions, and then turn
to alternative, more paternalistic, welfare criteria.
4.2 Robust expected utility
Consider ﬁrst the case where the central bank uses the agents’ expected utility functions to evaluate welfare.
In this case, the envelope theorem tells us that the indirect eﬀect due to the change of insurance decisions is
22second-order, and that the only beneﬁt is the direct eﬀect.
In our model, we have derived that the expected utility for an agent at the optimal choices of x and y




Oﬀering more insurance against the second-shock leads agents to increase both x and y. The eﬀect on y
is direct, whereas the eﬀect on x is an indirect eﬀect of reoptimization of agents’ portfolios. However, using









since y = λB
λ+δ+λB Z.
While there is a welfare beneﬁt of providing a government guarantee, the value of the beneﬁt is substan-
tially the same in the benchmark and the robust economies.13 In both cases, the economy lacks collateral to
fully insure agents against shocks. The beneﬁt of the extra unit of Z is limited to the direct eﬀect of providing
agents more insurance against an adverse outcome. It stems from our assumption that the government can
create liquidity to insure a shock from sources that the private sector cannot, as in Woodford (1990) and
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). As we show next, this logic does not apply if we consider alternative welfare
criteria.
4.3 Fully informed central bank
Consider a welfare criterion based on agent’s decisions, but evaluated at the reference λ’s. In this case the
envelope theorem argument breaks down for the robust economy and the reallocation of private insurance
from second-shock to ﬁrst-shock insurance has ﬁrst order eﬀects. Since in equilibrium the agent “exagerates”
the likelihood of a two-shock event relative to a single-shock event, the reallocation of resources toward ﬁrst-
shock insurance has a ﬁrst order beneﬁt.
The expected value of the direct eﬀect of intervention for the central bank is:
φ2u (y), (26)
13Recall that a liquidity shock eliminates all proﬁts. We have explored a setup where the shock reduces proﬁts to a level of
π>0. We ﬁnd that in this case the beneﬁt of the lender of last resort policy may be greater in the robust than in the benchmark
economy, even if agents’ expected utility is the welfare criterion. When π is suﬃcient large, agents in the benchmark economy
may eschew insurance agains the extreme two-shock event in favor of increasing insurance against the single-shock event. In
contrast, agents in the robust economy always insure against the two-shock event. Thus robust agents further value insurance
against an extreme event, while agents in the benchmark economy have limited (expected) valuation for such insurance. Notice
that here the beneﬁt of the policy comes from the agent’s valuation of the extra insurance rather than from the reorganization
of its portfolio in the presence of the policy.
23where φ2 is the (true) probability the central bank assigns to a two-shock event at the time of commitment
(date 0).
The total (direct plus indirect) expected value of the government intervention is:







where  VG denotes the expected value of intervention evaluated using the central banks’s probability distri-
bution.





Using this relation, as well as the constraint that dx
dG +
dy
dG = 1, we ﬁnd,












Finally, we divide this total eﬀect of intervention by the direct eﬀect of intervention to construct a private













Proposition 4 When λB = λ (benchmark economy), the total beneﬁt of intervention is limited to the direct
beneﬁt and
Mbe =1 .
For λB >λ , there is an indirect beneﬁt stemming from the reoptimization of agents’ portfolios:
Mr > 1.
Intuitively, the beneﬁt of intervention in the robust economy stems from the reaction of the private sector
to the central bank’s guarantee. When agents make their insurance decisions, they are overly concerned about
receiving the shock second, and use too high an assessment of the likelihood of the two-shock event. This
breaks the envelope theorem argument under the central banks’ objective function. By oﬀering to insure
the two-shock event directly, the central bank leads the agent to free up resources to insure the more likely
one-shock event ( dx
dG > 0).
4.4 Partially informed central bank
Our assumption that the central bank knows the true λ’s of the economy, despite the fact that agents may
be unsure about these λ’s, is a strong requirement. In this section, we consider a weaker informational
requirement on the central bank.
24Agent A knows that λB ∈ [max{λ − K,0},λ+ K] (and likewise for agent B). We suppose that the
central bank is also uncertain about the values of the λ’s, and only knows that the λ’s are drawn from
some non-degenerate symmetric joint distribution F(λcb
A,λ cb
B). We study the case where K>δ(i.e. the fully
robust economy).14
Because of symmetry in F(·), it is straightforward to show that the central bank restricts attention to
symmetric interventions, i.e. interventions that are equal regardless of whether it is A or B that is hit ﬁrst,
or second.





where  VG(λA,λ B)a n dDE(λA,λ B) respectively stand for the total and direct expected eﬀect of the inter-
vention conditional on λA and λB.
Then, for the fully robust economy,
EλAλB[ VG(λA,λ B)] =
1
2
u (Z/2)EλAλB[Pr(A;λA)+P r ( B;λB)],
where Pr(i;λi) denotes the probability that agent i is hit by a shock given its intensity λi. In the fully robust
economy, the promised resources in the two-shock event is split equally across the ﬁrst and second shock
event. Thus the marginal value of resources in the shock is u (Z/2) times one-half. This value is weighted
by the probability that shocks may occur, to either agent.
EλAλB[DE(λA,λ B)] = u (Z/2)EλAλB[Pr(A|B;λA,λ B)+P r ( B|A;λA,λ B)],
where Pr(i|j;λA,λ B) denotes the probability that agent i is hit second given intensities λA and λB.F o r
later use, let Pr(i|Noj;λA,λ B) denote the probability that agent i is hit by a shock while j is not, given
intensities λA andλB. The direct eﬀect reﬂects that resources are all spent in the event of the second shock.
Proposition 5 If the central bank knowledge of the markets’ probability models is limited to a non-degenerate
symmetric joint distribution F(λcb
A,λ cb
B) with some mass for ﬁnite and positive λcb
A and λcb
B, the multiplier in
the fully robust economy is,
Mr > 1.
Proof. From the symmetry of F(λcb
A,λ cb





14In the fully robust economy, the x and y decisions of agents are independent of λ, which simpliﬁes our analysis because we
avoid computing the central bank’s expectations over agents insurance decisions.
25Thus, the proposition holds if:
EλAλB[Pr(A;λA)] > 2EλAλB[Pr(A|B;λA,λ B)].
Expanding the left hand side of this expression, we have that:
EλAλB[Pr(A;λA)] = EλAλB[Pr(A|B;λA,λ B)+P r ( A|NoB;λA,λ B)+P r ( B|A;λA,λ B)]
= EλAλB[2Pr(A|B;λA,λ B)+P r ( A|NoB;λA,λ B)].
Replacing this expression back into the inequality, we have that the latter holds if and only if
EλAλB[Pr(A|NoB;λA,λ B)] > 0,
which is satisﬁed as long as F(λcb
A,λ cb
B) has some mass for ﬁnite λcb
B and positive λcb
A since δ>0.
Intuitively, the proof exploits the central bank’s knowledge of symmetry (in the distribution). Agent A
exaggerates the probability of being second. Agent B does the same. Thus the total beneﬁt of the lender
of last resort reﬂects exaggerated probabilities of agents being second. Despite not knowing the true λ’s,
the central bank knows that they are drawn from similar distributions. With a symmetric distribution over
λ, the probabilities the central bank uses reﬂects that the agents cannot both be second. This information
aﬀects the central bank’s calculation of the direct beneﬁt of intervention. The symmetry information is
thereby suﬃcient to conclude that the multiplier on intervention is greater than one.
4.5 Moral hazard critique
Under the paternalistic view, the public provision of insurance leads to improved private sector insurance
decisions. The complementarity between public and private provision of insurance in our model cuts against
the usual moralhazard critique of central bank interventions. This critique is predicated on agents responding
to the provision of publicinsurance by cutting back on their own insurance activities. In our model, in keeping
with the moral hazard critique, agents reallocate insurance away from the publicly insured shock. However,
when ﬂight to quality is the concern, the reallocation improves (ex-post) outcomes on average.15
Note that the central bank can achieve the same distribution of insurance if instead it commits to
intervene in the ﬁrst shock. However the expected cost of this policy is much larger than the extreme event
intervention, since the central bank rather than the private sector bears the cost of insurance against the
(likely) single-shock event. Agents would reallocate the expected resources from the central bank to the
15Note that if the direct eﬀect of intervention is insuﬃcient to justify intervention, then the lender of last resort policy is time
inconsistent. This result is not surprising as the beneﬁt of the policy comes precisely from the private sector reaction, not from
the policy itself.
26two-shock event, which is exactly the opposite of what the central bank wants to achieve. In this sense,
interventions in intermediate events are subject to the moral hazard critique.
To see this, let us return to the case of the fully informed central bank. The direct eﬀect of the intervention
in the event of the ﬁrst shock is φ1u (x), while the total eﬀect is,

















since λB >λand 0 < dx
dG < 1.
That is, the lender of last resort facility, to be eﬀective and improve private ﬁnancial markets, has to be
a last not an intermediate resort.
5 Financial Intermediary Risk and Aggregate Collateral
Throughout the paper we have made assumptions so that the economy is always in a situation where
aggregate collateral is limited. In this section we relax some of these assumptions and show that in this case
a fall in intermediation collateral can trigger a ﬂight to quality.
In this context, we derive a comparative static to contrast the response of the benchmark economy and
the robust economy to a tightening of collateral. We ﬁnd that the response to a collateral tightening is
qualitatively similar to the increase in preference for robustness that we have discussed in earlier sections.
The only substantive modiﬁcation we make in this section to our baseline model is to set β>0s o
that insurers now face a “consumption” cost of using insurance resources. We cannot derive a full analytical
solution for this case but present someresults characterizing the equilibrium. The section ends with numerical
solutions illustrating the equilibria for both benchmark and robust economy.
5.1 Abundant collateral
Suppose ﬁrst that Z is large enough so that, at equilibrium levels of demand, the ﬁnancial sector is uncon-
strained in selling insurance. In this case, the prices of the two ﬁnancial claims just reﬂect probabilities:
p(s)=βφ1(s)
q(s)=βφ2(s)














27It is easy to verify that the solution for robust agents is to set x(s)=y(s)=ys(t), and equal to a constant
for all s.16 The argument resembles the proof of Proposition 3.
At equal levels of x and y, the agent is robust to any value of λB that nature chooses and VλB in equation
(22) is equal to zero. Picking the point λB = λ, we see that choosing the constant levels for x and y is the
unique optimum for agents.
If agents are fully informed about λB, the same ﬁrst order conditions, evaluated at λB = λ, determine
the solution. Intuitively, since prices are actuarially fair, agents choose to insure equally against both the
likely one-shock event as well as the unlikely two-shock event.
The solution in the benchmark case is identical to the solution in the robust economy. Both economies







That is, Z represents the level of intermediation collateral which exactly satisﬁes agents insurance demand
when prices are “fair” (µ =0 ) .
Note at this point that when β = 0, as in the previous sections, Z →∞so that the economy is always
in the collateral-constrained region. Henceforth let us specialize to the case with β =1s ot h a tw h e nZ>Z
prices correspond to the standard actuarially fair prices.
Suppose now that Z falls below Z. Then, at actuarially fair prices, agents’ demand saturate the collateral










1 (s)u (x(s)) = φ1(s)+µ(s) (30)




2 (s)η(s − t)u (ys(t)) = φ2(s)η(s − t)+µs(t).




2 (s)u (y(s)) = φ2(s)+µ(s). (31)
16In addition, at this solution, the multiplier on the budget constraint is ψ = λ
(λ+δ)w0 .
28We consider the eﬀect of a collateral tightening by inspecting (30) and (31). The tightening increases the
multiplier µ(s) and raises prices, leading to a fall in both x(s)a n dy(s).
More interestingly, for an equal change in µ(s), the relative fall in x(s)a n dy(s) depends on the ratio
λB
λ+δ. Beginning from the case where x and y are equal, from (31) we can see that y falls more than x in
response to the tight collateral constraint since λB
λ+δ < 1. Moreover, since in the robust economy λB >λ ,
the decrease in y is smaller in the robust economy than in the benchmark economy.
To prove these statements, for each of (30) and (31), we construct the diﬀerence between the case where
µ(s)=0a n dµ(s) > 0 for the benchmark case (i.e λB = λ). For each of (30) and (31), the only diﬀerence in
the right-hand side across these two values of µ(s) is due to µ(s) > 0. Thus, the diﬀerence in the left-hand












Where x0(s)a n dy0(s) are the equilibrium values of x and y when the constraint does not bind, and x1(s)
and y1(s) are equilibrium values when the constraint does bind. As before, when the constraint does not
bind, x0(s)=y0(s). Since λ
λ+δ < 1, the percentage fall in x is smaller than the percentage fall in y.T h e ni t
follows that
|x1(s) − x0(s)| < |y1(s) − y0(s)|.
In the benchmark economy, the tightening of the collateral constraint leads to a smaller fall in x than in y.
Let us compare the robust economy next to the benchmark economy, where both economies are con-









In the robust case, λB rises beyond λ. From the above expression we can see that increasing λB causes the
right-hand side to rise (recall that φA
1 (s) is decreasing in λB for all s)a n dx(s) to fall. Thus, x(s)i sl o w e r
in the robust economy than the benchmark economy.
To summarize:
Proposition 6 Comparing equilibria in the robust economy and the benchmark economy across two diﬀerent
levels of aggregate collateral, we ﬁnd:
• If Z>Z , the equilibrium in the robust economy and the benchmark economy are identical.
• When Z<Z , x is lower in the robust economy than in the benchmark economy.
The robustness concerns only arise when the aggregate constraint binds. Indeed, this is an important
diﬀerence between “risk-aversion” and robustness in our setting. Comparing across two economies with




λ+δ , and is equal in these two cases.
295.3 Numerical example
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Notes: The ﬁgure illustrate the equilibrium selection of λB for Z<Z . λB is on the vertical axis and always lies between
λ (0.25) and λ + δ (0.75). Z is on the horizontal axis. As the ﬁnancial sector’s collateral of Z falls, robust agents become
increasingly focused on the chance that the other market will receive a shock ﬁrst and therefore increase λB above λ.
In this subsection, we present a numerical example to quantitatively illustrate the workings of our model
i nt h ec a s ew h e r eβ = 1. We study the fully robust economy. We choose δ =1 /2, to imply that recessions
last on average 2 years. We choose λ =1 /4. If recessions occur once every 8 years, this choice of λ implies
that the two-shock extreme event happens about every 48 years.
We normalize Π = 1. In order to prevent full insurance by the agents, we assume that w0
λ+δ
λ < 1, and
choose w0 =0 .3. With these parameters, Z =1 .8.
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of squeezing the ﬁnancial sector’s collateral on λB.A s Z falls below Z,
λB begins to rise above λ until it reaches a maximum at λ + δ. We note that this behavior is qualitatively
similar to the eﬀect of increasing K that we discussed earlier.
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of squeezing the ﬁnancial sector’s collateral on the agents’ choice of x/y.F o r
the robust economy, x/y varies over s. We present the probability-weighted average value of x/y over all s.
This average behavior of x/y is representative of the behavior of x/y for moderate values of s (s<3y e a r s ) .
As the ﬁnancial sector’s collateral of Z falls, robust agents become increasingly focused on the chance that













Notes: The ﬁgure contrasts the behavior of x/y between the robust economy and the benchmark economy, over the range
Z<Z . x/y is on the vertical axis. Z is on the horizontal axis. For the robust economy, x/y varies over s. We present the
probability-weighted average value of x/y over all s. The average behavior of x/y is representative of the behavior of x/y for
moderate values of s (s<3 years). As the ﬁnancial sector’s collateral of Z falls, robust agents become increasingly focused
on the chance that the other market will receive a shock ﬁrst, and insure roughly equally against receiving the shock ﬁrst or
second. Agents in the benchmark economy account for the fact that collateral is scarce, and direct insurance purchases to
the more likely single-shock event. Thus x/y rises as Z falls for the benchmark economy.
the other market will receive a shock ﬁrst, and insure roughly equally against receiving the shock ﬁrst or
second. Agents in the benchmark economy account for the fact that collateral is scarce, and direct insurance
purchases to the more likely single-shock event. Thus x/y rises as Z falls for the benchmark economy.
These diﬀerence in insurance-portfolios translate into diﬀerent output responses to a typical single shock
recession. When there are no shocks during a liquidity episode, per-capita output in both the benchmark
and robust economy is Π. When there is one shock during the liquidity episode, output falls to Π+x
2 .A s
noted earlier, x is lower in the robust economy than in the benchmark economy. As a result, output is lower
in the robust economy. When there are two shocks, output is simply
x+y
2 . However, since the collateral
constraint imposes that x + y = Z in both benchmark and robust economy, the output upon two shocks is
identical across both economies.
31Thus, in terms of output, the benchmark economy does strictly better than the robust economy. The
robust economy suﬀers deeper “typical” recessions, because robust agents become overly concerned with the
two-shock extreme event. This “over-reaction” is more severe when aggregate collateral is more binding. For
example, when Z is high and close to Z, at 1.7, the robust economy sees output decline by only one percent
of GDP more than the benchmark economy. Instead, when Z =1 .2, the decline is ﬁve percent of GDP more
in the robust than in the benchmark economy.
6 An Extension to Risky Collateral
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) observe that when collateral is both an input into production as well as security
for ﬁnancial claims, potentially large feedbacks emerge between the ﬁnancial and real side. Negative shocks
are ampliﬁed as ﬁnancing conditions tighten, reducing demand for collateral as a productive input, reducing
collateral values, and reinforcing the ﬁnancial tightening.
We can consider how Kiyotaki and Moore’s insight applies within our model by assuming that the collat-
eral of the ﬁnancial sector is (exogenously) risky, but related to the shocks in market A and B.T h i se x e r c i s e
gives us some understanding of the eﬀect of collateral risk, without working out a full-blown production
model.
6.1 Modeling assumptions
The only uncertainty in the economy is in the number of shocks. We assume that if the number of shocks is
zero or one, then the total collateral of the ﬁnancial sector is Z, but if there are two shocks, then collateral
falls to z<Z . This could happen, for example, if the second shock results in a fall in investment and demand
for collateral assets (such as land or real estate).
The introduction of risky collateral requires us to rewrite the collateral constraint of insurers:
ˆ x ≤ Z (32)
ˆ y ≤ max{z − ˆ x,0}. (33)
If only one shock hits the economy, insurers have enough collateral to cover up to x ﬁnancial claims. The
new constraint is that if the second shock aﬀects the economy, not only has some of the collateral of insurers
been pledged to cover the ﬁrst shock, but also there is less collateral in total.
We also modify our model so that in the event of a liquidity shock, proﬁts drop to π>0 rather than
π =0 .W h e nπ>0, agents eﬀectively are “endowed” with π units of ﬁrst-shock and second-shock claims, so
that their decisions are taken net of this π. In particular their decisions over x(s)a n dys(t) are as described





λ +m in {K,δ}
δ − min{K,δ}
Z.
Then it is straightforward to show that for the benchmark case, π provides suﬃcient insurance against
the (low probability) second-shock that agents use all of their wealth to purchase insurance against the (high
probability) ﬁrst shock:
¯ x
be = Z ¯ y
be =0 .
In contrast, agents in the robust economy continue to demand second-shock insurance, and in the particular








Finally, we revert to the case where β =0 .
6.2 Ampliﬁcation
Since in the benchmark economy, xbe = Z and ybe = 0, collateral risk has no eﬀect on equilibrium because
agents recognize that the risk in collateral is not relevant for their payoﬀs. The relevant amount of collateral
constraining the ﬁnancial sector continues to be Z. Of course, by not insuring y, the benchmark economy
experiences large ex-post (distributional) utility costs if there is a two-shocks event. Nonetheless, these
events are suﬃciently rare that forgoing insurance is optimal.
In the robust economy, both x and y are positive. The risk in collateral values has a signiﬁcant impact
in the robust economy because when agents insure against two shocks, the relevant collateral constraint for
the single-shock shift to (33). Oﬀering more y claims requires intermediaries to lock-up collateral. But this
reduces the amount of liquidity insurance available for x.
The eﬀective collateral for the robust economy is the amount of collateral in the worst-case, two-shock
event (z). Relative to the benchmark, insurance against the typical single-shock event falls by at least Z −z,
amplifying the ﬂight-to-quality problem we have identiﬁed.
6.3 Demand for Assets and Collateral Premia
Because in the robust economy agents evaluate insurers based on their collateral levels in the worst-case
scenario of two shocks, insurers have an incentive to shore up their worst-case collateral so as to increase
their capacity. In a sense, the agents’ robustness preferences induces “risk-aversion” in the insurers. In
contrast, in the benchmark economy the credibility of the insurer is based on his collateral in the one-shock
event. While still averse to losses, the insurer is more concerned about moderate losses.
33We parameterize this eﬀect by calculating the risk-premia that an insurer will assign to an inﬁnitesimal
amount of the following two Arrow-Debreu claims: (1) A claim that delivers an extra unit of collateral on
the occurrence of the ﬁrst shock; and (2) A claim that delivers an extra unit of collateral on the occurrence
of the second shock. The objective probabilities of each of these events are φ1 and φ2.
We note that the claims are not typical Arrow-Debreu securities, since the events are not mutually
exclusive. The second shock can occur only once the ﬁrst shock has occurred, φ1 >φ 2.
The valuations of the two claims are denoted as ξ1φ1 and ξ2φ2,w h e r et h eξ’s are the price premia
intermediaries are willing to pay for claims on ﬁrst-and second-shock events (i.e. they are the premia on
these claims after accounting for the probability of the events).
In the benchmark economy (recall that we have set β = 0 and that in this case the single shock constraint
is binding), the extra collateral in the second-shock event is useless to the insurer so that
ξbe
2 =0 .
On the other hand, the extra collateral in the ﬁrst shock is helpful since it loosens the collateral constraint on
selling x claims. We note in the equilibrium we have constructed, agents pay w0 in total to buy Z insurance








In contrast, in the robust economy the extra collateral in the second-shock event is valuable. Following
the same logic to calculate prices in the worst case scenario, the value of an extra unit of collateral is w0/z.









Collateral in the ﬁrst-shock event is also valuable in the robust economy, because the second-shock event is
subsumed by the ﬁrst-shock event (i.e. the extra collateral loosens the constraint in the worst-case scenario).



















Proof. Follows directly from Z>zand φ1 >φ 2.
The insurer in the robust economy is most concerned about the worst-case event and is willing to pay
the highest collateral-premia for claims that help him shore up the worst-case collateral level. Moreover,
34w0/z > w0/Z, so that the robust insurer always pays a higher collateral-premium than the benchmark
insurer – even against ﬁrst-shock events. This pattern of prices is in keeping with an agent who is more
“risk-averse” against losses.
An empirical regularity during ﬂight-to-quality episodes is the increase in demand for safety and the rise
in risk premia. Demand for riskless assets such as Treasury Bills or bank deposits increases. The spread
between Commercial Paper and Treasury Bills typically widens during these episodes. Volatility sensitive
ﬁnancial measures, such as the prices of out-of-the money put options on the S&P500 index, or the VIX
implied volatility index, rise.
Although our model is too stylized to replicate these observed patterns precisely, these phenomena are
broadly consistent with increased aversion to the worst-case scenario. If the ﬁnancial intermediaries we
have identiﬁed are the marginal investors in these asset markets, then their risk-valuations aﬀect prices, and
plausibly match the observed phenomena.
Our model also provides a new perspective on the cyclical indicator property of the Commercial-Paper
to Treasury-Bills spread (see e.g., Stock and Watson, 1989, Friedman and Kuttner, 1993, Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox, 1993). In our model the rise in the spread is a symptom of agents’ robustness concerns, as
opposed to a contributing factor to a recession. But the robustness concerns trigger actions that lead to
underinsurance against the single-shock event, and may thereby lead to a recession.
7 Final remarks
Flight to quality is a pervasive phenomenon that exacerbates the impact of recessionary shocks. In this
paper we present a model of this phenomenon based on robust decision making by ﬁnancial specialists. We
show that when aggregate intermediation collateral is plentiful, robustness considerations do not interfere
with the functioning of private insurance markets (credit lines). However, when agents think that aggregate
intermediation collateral is scarce, they take a set of protective actions to guarantee themselves safety, but
which leave the aggregate economy overexposed to recessionary shocks.
In this context, a Lender of Last Resort policy is useful if used to support extreme rather than intermediate
events. The main beneﬁt of this policy comes not so much from the direct eﬀect of the policy during extreme
events, which are very rare, but from its ability to unlock private sector collateral during milder, and far
more frequent, contractions.
The implications of the framework extend beyond the particular interpretation we have given to agents
and policymakers. For example, in the international context one could think of our agents as countries and
the policymaker as the IMF or other IFI’s. Then, our model prescribes that the IMF not support the ﬁrst
country hit by a sudden stop, but to commit to intervene once contagion takes place. The beneﬁt of this
35policy comes primarily from the additional availability of private resources to limit the impact of the initial
pullback of capital ﬂows.
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